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BETWEEN HUNTLEYAND SALEM: THE CURRENT
STATE OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY IN
PENNSYLVANIA TO AFFECT GAS DRILLING
THROUGH ZONING
Dan Raichel*
This article examines the scope of Pennsylvania is preemption
of municipal authority to zone natural gas drilling activities in light of
two relatively recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act and its local ordinance preemption
provision. Although these cases define outer boundaries of permissible
municipal regulation along the spectrum uf/possible zoning controls - i.e.
what types ofordinance provisions would be either definitively permitted or
preempted - substantial questions remain as to what extent a municipality
may use traditional zoning power to zone gas drilling activities. This
paper explores those grey areas, and attempts to assess the preemption
risk of various types ofzoning controls.
* Dan Raichel is a recent graduate of Columbia Law School and a soon-to-be
member of the Illinois Bar. Currently, he is a legal fellow at the Natural Resources
Defense Council in New York City where he continues to have the pleasure of
working on issues related to municipal authority over gas drilling in Pennsylvania
and New York. Dan would like to thank Susan Kraham for getting him started
on this work, everyone else at the Columbia Environmental Law Clinic, and of
course, his parents.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent explosion of gas drilling activity in the Marcellus
Shale has brought a wave of public health and welfare concerns
to Pennsylvania citizens. Far from the city lights of Pittsburgh or
Philadelphia, rural residents are dealing on a daily basis with a
host of environnental issues, ranging from water contamination to
increased vehicle traffic to air and noise pollution. As these concerns
mount, more municipalities are trying to take matters into their own
hands by passing local zoning ordinances that attempt to mitigate
some of the most noxious elements of the new drilling activities.
Unfortunately, municipal ability to regulate modern hydraulic
fracturing is severely circumscribed by the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas
Act ("0GA"), passed long before the advent of hydraulic fracturing,
which specifically preempts municipal authority to regulate gas
drilling.
This article will focus specifically on the explicit preemption
clause of the OGA, how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
interpreted that clause, and the three ways in which a municipal
zoning ordinance,2 either in whole or in part, may be preempted by the
OGA.3 This article also will outline a two-part test for evaluating the
risk of preemption for a particular ordinance, including a spectrum
of risk that specific ordinance provisions may be preempted.
'Several months after the Symposium in March, 2011, legislation was proposed
in the Pennsylvania House in response to the Huntley and Saleni decisions. The
bill, known as Act 13, was signed into law on February 14, 2012, and will dra-
matically alter muncipal zoning authority over gas drilling if an when it takes
effect. The validity of major portions of the act are currently being challenged in
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, and the provisions of the act relating to
municipal authority have been enjoined from taking effect until next winter at the
earliest. In the interim, the Huntely and Salem cases remain good law, and will
also be useful in the future in interpreting ambiguities in Act 13 as well as munici-
pal preemption provisions of oil and gas laws in other states.
2 For an explanation of how the term "ordinance" is used in this article, see infra
note 27.
This article focuses mainly on OGA preemption of zoning ordinances passed un-
der the authority of the MPC, and not on laws promulgated under other legislative
grants of authority. It is the opinion of this author, however, that the preemption
analysis for ordinances passed under other grants of authority xxould be heavily
influenced by the preemption analy sis applicable to zoning ordinances.
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I. PREEMPTION OF LOCAL AUTHoRITY UNDER THE OGA
In Peisylvania, municipalities4 derive their local law-
making powers from specific grants of authority by the state
government. As such, the state also has the ability to limit that
authority. This relationship is illustrated in the interaction between
the Municipalities Planning Code ("MPC") and the OGA. The
local zoning authority that the state granted in the MPC is partially
undermined by Section 602 ofthe OGA, the Act's explicit preemption
provision. Under Section 602, most local ordinances "purporting" to
regulate gas drilling are unequivocally preempted, but there is a thin
exemption for ordinances promulgated under the MPC, i.e., zoning
ordinances:
Except with respect to ordinances adopted pursuant
to ... the Municipalities Planning Code, and the ...
Flood Plain Management Act, all local ordinances
and enactments purporting to regulate oil and gas
well operations regulated by this [A]ct are hereby
superseded. No ordinances or enactments adopted
pursuant to the aforementioned acts shall contain
provisions which impose conditions, requirements or
limitations on the same fkatures of oil and gas well
operations regulated by this [4]ct or that accoiplish
the same purposes as set Ibrth in this [A ct. The
Commonwealth, by this enactment, hereby preempts
and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as
herein defined.6
4 Municipality" is defined by the MPC as "any city of the second class A or third
class, borough, incorporated town, township of the first or second class, county of
the second class through eighth class, home rule municipality, or any similar gen-
eral purpose unit of government which shall hereafter be created by the General
Assembly." 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10107 (2011).
Id. §§ 101, 601 (2011).
6Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-701.7, 601.602 (2011) (emphasis
added). As noted by the court in the [Intley; case, the italicized passage was add-
ed to the OGA by legislative amendment in 1992. Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v.
Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. 2009).
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While zoning ordinances relating to gas drilling are not
wholly preempted, they still cannot: (1) regulate a "feature" of gas
drilling or (2) attempt to "accomplish the same purposes" as set
forth in the OGA.7 Although this language is not convoluted, it is
brief and uses ambiguous terms not elsewhere defined in the Act.8
What constitutes a "feature" of gas drilling? How should the purpose
of a local ordinance be determined, and how will that purpose be
compared to those of the OGA? These types of questions may have
received little attention before the hydraulic fracturing boom, but
are now highly contentious and litigated issues.9
II. THE Two ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM: THE PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME CoURT's DECISIONS IN THE HUNFLEY AND SALEM
CASES
In 2009, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to dispel
some of the ambiguity in the language of Section 602 in two decisions
released on the same day - the Huntley and Salem decisions.' 0 These
cases are, to date, the only cases in which this court has squarely
addressed the issue of preemption of municipal authority under
Section 602. Although the cases clarify some aspects of Section 602
and outline the types of preemption an ordinance might face, the two
ordinances challenged in these cases represent the extremes in their
approaches to the regulation of gas drilling: at one end, regulation of
drilling by either inclusion or exclusion from a particular zone, and
at the other, a purposeful and comprehensive scheme to regulate gas
drilling. Understanding these two extremes helps to determine what
types of zoning provisions are, or are not, definitively preempted.
However, it is still unclear how courts should interpret challenged
ordinances that do not lie between these extremes. To understand the
Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONs. STAr. §§1-701.7,601.602(2011).
For example, neither "feature" nor "oil and gas well operations" are defined in
the OGA. Id.§ 601.103.
9 See e.g. Huntley, 964 A.2d at 855; Range Resources Appalachia, LLC v. Salem
Twp., 964 A.2d 869 (Pa. 2009); Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
"Huntley, 964 A.2d at 855; Salem, 964 A.2d at 869.
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gray area that remains between these two cases, it is helpful first to
examine the cases themselves.
A. The Huntley Decision - The Inapplicability of Feature and
Purpose Preemption to Certain Location-Based Regulations
In Huntley, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the
authority of a municipality to include or exclude gas drilling as a
conditional use within an area zoned as residential. The case began
when Huntley and Huntley, Inc., an engineering company, applied
for a conditional use permit for two leased parcels of land in the
Borough of Oakmont zoned R- 1, in which "extraction of minerals"
was only allowed as a conditional use."1 The Borough Council denied
the permit on the grounds that natural gas was not a mineral within
the meaning of the zoning ordinance and that the OGA "did not
preempt the Borough's power to restrict the location of gas drilling
and wellheads." Disagreeing with both grounds, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court held that the ordinance preempted municipal
power as applied to the placement of gas Wells.1 In reversing the
commonwealth court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court looked
to both explicit types of preemption mentioned in Section 602:
"feature" preemption and "purpose" preemption. More specifically,
the court examined whether (1) the exclusion of oil and gas activities
from a particular zone constituted regulation of a "feature" of oil and
gas drilling operations, and (2) whether the municipality's purpose
behind regulating the location of oil and gas wells through the use
of zoning impermissibly overlapped with those enumerated in the
OGA.
Using dictionary definitions of "feature," (a "prominent
or conspicuous characteristic"), and "operation," ("a process or
manner of functioning"), the court found that the placement of a
well by either inclusion or exclusion from a particular zone was not
a "feature" as defined by the Act because "it is not a characteristic
of the manner or process by which the well is created, functions,
" Huntley 964 A.2d at 857.
121d. at 858.
" Id. at 859-60.
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is maintained, ceases to function, or is ultimately destroyed or
capped."" Features regulated by the OJGA only pertain to "technical
aspects of well function and matters ancillary thereto (such as
registration, bonding, and well site restoration)," whereas a well's
location is one of its features only "in a general sense."
To determine whether the ordinance accomplishes the same
purposes "as set forth" by the Act, the court compared the objectives
of the ordinance to the enumerated purposes of the Act, which are
to:
(1) Permit the optimal development of the oil and
gas resources of Pennsylvania consistent with the
protection of the health, safety, environment and
property of the citizens of the Commonwealth.
(2) Protect the safety of personnel and facilities
employed in the exploration, development, storage
and production of natural gas or oil or the mining of
coal.
(3) Protect the safety and property rights of
persons residing in areas where such exploration,
development, storage or production occurs.
(4) Protect the natural resources, environmental
rights and values secured by the Pennsylvania
Constitution.16
Given that much of zoning regulation deals with "safety
and property rights," and, to a lesser degree, environmental values,
a broad reading of Section 602's preemption clause likely would
preempt most, if not all, zoning regulation of gas drilling. The court,
however, declined to read Section 602 this broadly. Although the
court did find some overlap between the purposes of the ordinance
and the OGA, "the most salient objectives" of the Borough were
"preserving the character of residential neighborhoods" and
14Id at 864.
1Id
6Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58SPA. CONs. STAT. §601.102 (2011).
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"encouraging 'beneficial and compatible land uses," 7  both
enumerated in the purpose section of the Borough of Oakmont's
Zoning Ordinance ("BOZO").
There are a few things to note about the court's treatment of
both "feature" and "purpose" preemption from Section 602. First,
xwhile the court did limit "features" to only technical aspects of gas
drilling, it also broadened the term beyond the actual drilling of
the well to include all "matters ancillary thereto," which includes
"registration, bonding, and well site restoration."1" Second, even
though the court generally held that location-based restrictions did
not regulate a "feature" of gas drilling, the court was still hesitant
to extend a municipality's ability to restrict the location of a well
through the use of setbacks. In footnote ten of the opinion, the court
cautioned that their opinion did not "say that an ordinance would
be enforceable to the extent it sought to increase specific setback
requirements contained in the Act."' 9 Although setbacks were not at
issue in the case, the footnote reveals the court's extreme hesitance to
allow a municipality to regulate an aspect of gas drilling specifically
covered by the OGA.20
Additionally, with regard to purpose preemption, it is
important to note that the court did not scrutinize whether there
is any overlap between a challenged ordinance and the OGA, but
instead scrutinized whether the most salient purposes of an ordinance
overlap with the enumerated purposes of the OGA. Here, the court
compared the fourteen enumerated purposes of the BOZO to those
of the OGA, but only selected two of those fourteen as the most
salient. What criteria the court used to select these purposes as the
most salient remains a mystery, as does the issue of whether these
purposes are meant to be exclusively permissible or whether other
" Huntley, 964 A.2d at 865 (citing to BOROUGH OF OAKMONT, PA., CODE §§ 205-
3(A)(7), 305-3(A)(10) (1994)).
"Id at 864.
19Id at 864 n.10.
20 Setbacks are covered in Section 205 of the OGA. Two specific setback require-
ments for wells are provided: (a) 200ft. from any existing building or water well
without consent of the owner, and (b) 100ft. from any stream, spring, body of
water, or wetlands larger than one acre in size. Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. §601.205 (2011).
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traditional zoning purposes also are permissible. Even if it is the
former, it seems that the court is willing to tolerate some overlap
with the OGA because the purposes of "preserving the character
of residential neighborhoods" and "encouraging beneficial and
compatible land uses" do have some intersection with the safety,
environmental, and property rights concerns addressed by purposes
three and four of the OGA.21
B. The Salem Decision - Common Law Conflict Preemption of
a Comprehensive Scheme to Regulate Oil and Gas Drilling
In contrast to the mere location-based restrictions of the
BOZO, the recently promulgated appendix to the Salem Township's
Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance ("SALDO,"
"SALDO Appendix," or "Appendix") at issue in the Salem case was
vastly more directed and forceful in its approach to gas drilling. The
Appendix: (1) required a permit for all drilling-related activities:
(2) imposed bonding requirements before drilling could begin; (3)
regulated the location, design, and construction of access roads, gas
transmission lines, and water treatment facilities for gas drilling:
(4) regulated the construction and plugging of well heads; (5)
established requirements for site access and restoration: and (6)
provided that any violation of the SALDO Appendix can trigger
fines and/or imprisonment." In striking down the Appendix as
preempted, the court found that many elements of the ordinance
were preempted by the express feature and purpose preemptions
identified in the Huntley case. Many Appendix provisions, such
as those related to well-capping and site restoration, regulated
technical aspects of gas drilling, and the Appendix's "stated purposes
overlap[ped] substantially with the goals as set forth in the OGA."
Importantly, the court also identified a third basis for preemption
outside of Section 602- common law conflict preemption. Conflict
preemption maintains that "a local ordinance may not stand as an
obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of the
21Id § 601.102.
22 Range Res., LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 870-75 (Pa. 2000).
23 Id at 877.
1 2 BETWEEN HUNTLEYAND SALEM
Legislature."' 4 Because the SALDO Appendix was so extensive and
focused on gas drilling, it also triggered this type of preemption.
The court found the Appendix as a whole to be "an attempt by the
township to enact a comprehensive regulatory scheme relative to
oil and gas development within the municipality" at odds with
the OGA. Therefore, the Appendix was preempted as a whole by
conflict preemption.25
There are two important points to note about conflict
preemption with respect to gas drilling. First, this sort of preemption
is, to a degree, bound up with the two express types of preemption
under 602. A profusion of provisions regulating the features of gas
drilling or a clear purpose to do the same may be evidence of a
comprehensive scheme. Second, there is a possible important
distinction with respect to the consequence of a "comprehensive
scheme" determination. Once an ordinance is determined to be a
comprehensive scheme, wholesale invalidation of the ordinance
may be appropriate, even when the ordinance contains provisions
that are not expressly preempted by the OGA:
While the [t]ownship may be correct in arguing that
there are some aspects of the [Appendix] that are not
expressly covered directly by the Act, even these are
bound up with the overall regulatory scheme which
includes strict permitting and penalty provisions, and
phrased in such general terms - e.g., "the most direct
and feasible means," "shall not unreasonably restrict
access," etc. - as to provide the [t]ownship with
virtually unbridled discretion to deny permission to
drill. This is in stark contrast to, and in conflict with,
the Act's more permissive approach.26
As will be discussed in the next section, severability may
still be an option for ordinances that are not determined to be
comprehensive schemes, but it appears that once this threshold is
24 Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. 2009).
2 Salem, 964 A.2d at 875-77.
261d. at 876.
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crossed a court will be extremely reluctant to salvage any piece of
the ordinance. In other words, if the ordinance looks rotten, a court
will not bother to cut out the mold.
C. Unanswered Questions After Huntley and Salem
The Huntley and Salem cases provide us with a pretty clear
idea of what is likely to occur when an ordinance is challenged if
that ordinance either regulates gas drilling by excluding drilling
as a permitted use in a residential zone (municipality wins) or if it
attempts to create a comprehensive scheme to regulate gas drilling
(municipality loses). What would happen, however, to an otherwise
permissible ordinance with only two or three provisions expressly
preempted by the OGA? Wh1at would happen if an ordinance not
directed at gas drilling, such as fencing or aesthetic requirements
for all structures in a particular zone, nevertheless affects the oil and
gas industry? In other words, what would happen if a challenged
ordinance fell in between the two extremes of the Huntley and Salem
cases?
From this larger question, important specific questions arise.
First is the question of severability. Huntley dealt with an ordinance
that faced no express or conflict preemption: Salem dealt with an
ordinance that was so expressly preempted in every aspect, and so
expansive, that it was discarded as a whole. If a challenge arose
to an ordinance that was largely permissible, but contained only
a few expressly preempted provisions, what should a court do?
Although the court did not address the possibility of excising only
offending provisions from an ordinance, it seems like a reasonable
solution under these circumstances. Throwing out such an ordinance
in its entirety seems disrespectful to the municipality's legislative
authority granted by the MPC and specifically recognized by the
OGA; upholding the ordinance as a whole would not accord with
Section 602. Although severability is still an open question, it is
assumed later in this article that if a court encountered an ordinance
as described in this paragraph, it would sever or invalidate, as applied
to gas drilling, only the offending provisions.
27Here it helps to clarify What is meant by use of the term "rdinance" with regard
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Another question is the extent to which a municipality can
place conditions on gas drilling when it is included in a zone either
as a conditional or permitted use. Although the court in Huntley
upheld the ability of a municipality to exclude gas drilling from a
residential zone, the court also held that gas drilling was permitted as
a conditional use on the property in question because natural gas met
the definition of "mineral" under the language of the BOZO.28 The
fact that the court allowed gas drilling to be listed as a conditional
use seems to imply that at least sone conditions may be placed on
gas drilling, although it offers little guidance on what form those
conditions may take.
The third question is the extent to which a municipality can,
using either its authority under the MPC or another state statute,
issue an ordinance of general applicability (for example, a township-
wide noise ordinance), not explicitly directed at gas drilling, but that
has effects on gas drilling? In a footnote in the Salem decision, the
court, in talking about municipal authority under the Pennsylvania
Storm Water Management Act, declared that "[the court's] holding
here should not be construed to preclude local regulations duly
enacted pursuant to other state laws that incidentally affect oil and
gas development."' What is the test to determine whether the effect
of an ordinance is incidental? Is it enough that the ordinance or
provision is not directed, either explicitly or covertly, at gas drilling?
Or will a regulation of general applicability become invalid or
cease to apply to gas drilling when its interference with gas drilling
activities reaches a certain magnitude?
to severability. While the larger zoning code of a municipality is commonly called
an "ordinance," the term here refers to the discrete section of the larger code
that addresses or affects gas drilling. Given that many municipalities are legis-
latively addressing gas drilling issues, "ordinance" usually refers to those pieces
of legislation as a whole. For example, the SALDO Appendix was originally an
ordinance that amended the Salem Township Subdivision and Land Development
Ordinance. Although the court did remove this appendix from the larger code, it
did not sever any portion of the original amending ordinance.
28As the ordinance did not define "mineral," the use of the MPC definition of the
term was upheld. Salem, 964 A.2d at 867.
29Id. at 876 n.8 (emphasis added).
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With respect to all of these questions, the ordinance's
purpose also remains important. The Htntley court selected two
purposes out of the fourteen enumerated purposes of the BOZO -
the preservation of the character of residential neighborhoods and
the encouragement of beneficial and compatible land uses - as the
most salient purposes of that ordinance. The court failed, however,
to explain how it came to that decision, or if other purposes would
have been considered permissible if they were found to be the most
salient. The court similarly gave little guidance as to how to glean
the purpose of an ordinance that does not have an explicit purpose
section. Additionally, there is the issue of how the ordinance is
implemented. Could an otherwise permissible ordinance of general
applicability that is applied in a discriminatory manner toward
gas drilling nonetheless be considered to have an impermissible
purpose?
Finally, there are questions concerning comprehensive
scheme preemption. As mentioned in the Salem case summary
above, it is not clear what triggers this sort of preemption, especially
when dealing with an ordinance not as broad-ranging as the SALDO
Appendix. The court found it significant that the SALDO Appendix's
"stated purposes overlap [ped] substantially with the goals as set forth
in the 0GA."so But how important is a gas-drilling related purpose
section to finding a comprehensive scheme? Does purpose matter to
comprehensive scheme preemption, or is the test instead whether an
ordinance gives a township "virtually unbridled discretion to deny
permission to drill?" 1
"Id. at 877.
Id at 876. Consider what would happen if a township changed its zoning map
so that every zone in the township became a residential zone. Given the court's
holding in Huntley that municipalities may exclude gas drilling from residential
zones, would this not also give the township "unbridled discretion to deny" gas
drilling? Whether or not this type of ordinance may be considered a "comprehen-
sive scheme" wiii be addressed, infra, in the "Note on Complete Exclusion of Gas
Drilling" section.
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III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ZONING PROVISIONS FOUND
IN THE BOROUGH OF OAKMONT ORDINANCE AND THE SALEM
TOWNSHIP ORDINANCES AT ISSUE IN THE HUNFLEY AND SALEM
CASES
To help shed some light on the questions posed above, it
is useful to examine the actual ordinances at issue in the Huntley
and Salem cases. Specifically, the conditional use provisions of
the BOZO may illuminate what sort of conditions may be placed
on gas drilling as a conditional use, and the SALDO Appendix
might provide insight into the trigger for comprehensive scheme
preemption.
A. The Borough of Oakmont Ordinance at Issue in Huntley
Although not discussed by the court in Huntley, all conditional
uses, including "mineral extraction," are subject to certain automatic
conditions under the BOZO.3 Specifically, Article X of the BOZO
imposes performance standards on all conditional uses, which
include, among others, restrictions on noise, vibration, glare, smoke
emissions, odors, air pollution, and liquid and hazardous waste.
The standards target both issues generally within the province of
local regulation, such as the prevention of common nuisances, as
well as larger environmental issues often regulated at the state and
national level. For instance, Article X requires that "objectionable"
noise be "muffled or otherwise controlled," but also that "no ...
forms of air pollution shall be permitted which can cause any damage
to the health of persons, to animals, vegetation or other property."34
All of the environmental performance standards set forth in Article
32 BOROUGH OF OAKMONT CODE, PA., § 205-45 (2005), available at http:x/x/www.
ecode360.com/8795037 (emphasis added) (relevantly: "(B) The conditional use
shall not involve any element or cause any condition that may be dangerous, in-
jurious or noxious to any other property or persons and shall comply with the
performance standards in Article X herein.... (D) The developer shall have the
burden of providing evidence to Oakmont of compliance with the general require-
ments of this section and the specific requirements of this article.")
Id. § 205-45.
341d. § 205(105)-(111).
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X are general and brief, such as the air pollution standard, and most
reference state environnental standards, often requiring compliance
with those standards>
The Huntley court did not mention Article X because
plaintiffs never challenged its provisions. The court determined that
the location-based restrictions were not preempted by the OGA,
and held that natural gas drilling met the definition of mineral
extraction as used in the BOZO, contrary to the Borough Council's
interpretation. After reversing the decision of the Borough Council
to refuse a conditional use permit, the court omitted any discussion
of the automatic conditions of Article X, even in dicta. Although
Article X of the BOZO may merely have escaped the court's notice,
it seems that if a municipality had no power to place conditions on
gas drilling once the decision was made to include it in a particular
zone, the court would have indicated as such. The omission of any
discussion of the clearly applicable conditions of Article X supports
at least the possibility that, at minimum, a municipality may place
restrictions on gas drilling that prevent common nuisance effects of
gas drilling, and, at maximum, impose some more broad-ranging
environnental conditions.
The permissibility of conditions relating to common
nuisance effects and environmental effects is further supported by
the overall reasoning of the opinion. Common nuisances, such as
noise, odor, glare, and visible smoke, are all instantly perceptible
and have the ability to greatly disrupt the harmony of residential
living. Controlling these types of nuisances is consistent with
preserving the character of residential neighborhoods and is, indeed,
, See, e.g., id. (regulating liquid waste or sewage: "No discharge shall be permit-
ted into a reservoir, sewage or storm disposal system, river or stream, open body
of water or into the ground of any materials in such a way or of such nature or
temperature as could contaminate any water supply or otherwise cause the emis-
sion of dangerous or objectionable elements. Such objectionable contaminants or
emissions must be treated so that insoluble substances (oils, grease, acids, alkalis
or other chemicals) are in accordance with the standards as approved by appropri-
ate agencies of the Department of Environmental Protection and the regulations
of the Borough.")
6Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 867 (Pa. 2009).
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at the historical heart of traditional zoning purposes." Additionally,
compliance with general standards may require the modification of
technical aspects of well operation, but no "features" of gas drilling
are explicitly addressed by Article X. Even the less traditional,
environnentally-based general standards of Article X, such as those
dealing with air pollution or liquid waste, are supported by the
court's opinion. Presumably, these provisions were also designed to
safeguard residential communities against potentially incompatible
uses, and their general scope steers clear of any feature of gas drilling.
Furthermore, the Huntley court cited with approval to a Colorado
Supreme Court decision recognizing that a municipality's "interest
in land-use control ... is one of orderly development and use of land
in a manner consistent with local demographic and environmental
concerns. 8
Despite this apparent support, however, the issue of
permissible purpose is still unclear. In addition to Article X, the
Huntley court also ignored some important aspects of Article 1,
specifically, twelve of the fourteen enumerated purposes listed in
the "Community Development Objectives" section. While most of
those purposes are very similar to the preservation of the character
of residential neighborhoods and the encouragement of beneficial
and compatible uses, there are some purposes that have stronger
crossover with the enumerated purposes of the OGA. For example,
purpose four deals with the "stewardship of our natural resources
and setting" and purpose two proposes to "ensure the health, safety,
and welfare of Oakmont Borough residents through effective
planning." These purposes seem closer to the enumerated purposes
of the OGA, calling for the protection of natural resources and
resident safety, than those chosen as the "most salient" by the court,
yet this crossover was ignored. This could mean either that the court
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (recogniz-
ing that one of the valid purposes of zoning is to "decrease noise and other condi-
tions which produce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more favorable
environment in which to rear children, etc... .").
3 8Hntley, 964 A.2d at 865 (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of La Plata v. Bow-
en/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992) (emphasis added).
39Borough of Oaknont, Pa., Code § 205-3(A)(2)-(4) (2004).
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is willing to ignore impermissible purposes where there are "more
salient" permissible purposes, or that environnental, public health,
and safety purposes are permissible only to a degree. This distinction
is significant, as the former would support only conditions designed
to eliminate more traditional nuisances, while the latter would
support the use of generally applicable environmental conditions as
well.
B. The Salem Township Ordinance at Issue in Salem
Unlike the BOZO, the SALDO Appendix was not a
comprehensive township zoning ordinance, although it was found
to be "a comprehensive regulatory scheme relative to oil and gas
development."" While the Salem court announced no concrete
rule for determining the trigger for "comprehensive scheme"
preemption, it did identify a number of provisions in the Appendix
that ran afoul of the OGA. As these provisions also were found to
be expressly preempted by the purpose and feature preemptions of
Section 602. the SALDO Appendix provides insight into all three
bases for preemption. The following is an analysis of the relevant
aspects of the SALDO Appendix and their relation to these types of
preemption.
1. SALDO Appendix Purpose & Comprehensiveness
The SALDO's's explicit purpose section mentions gas
drilling, which describes the SALDO as enacted to "[enable]
continuing oil and gas drilling . . . while ensuring the orderly
development of property through the location of access ways,
transportation lines, and treatment facilities necessarily associated
with same," 4 1 was central to the finding that the SALDO Appendix
was preempted under both purpose and comprehensive scheme
preemption. The Salem court found this language demonstrated that
the ordinance's most salient purposes overlapped inappropriately
40Range Res., LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 875 (Pa. 2009).
41 Salem Tovwnship, Pa., SALDO Appendix B, Preamble (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter
"SALDO" or "SALDO Appendix"]I.
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with those of the OGA because it focused "solely on regulating oil
and gas development," rather than on zoning or land development
generally. The goals of the ordinance also "subsume[d] protecting
the development of neighboring properties ... and protecting natural
resources." 43
Apart from the particular goals set out in the SALDO, the
breadth of the ordinance also caused concern. The court disapproved
of the "comprehensive and restrictive nature of [the Ordinance's]
regulatory scheme," 41 finding that it covered "the full panoply of
issues relating to oil and gas drilling."4 5 This analysis focuses on the
aggregate effect of the ordinance as opposed to the impermissibility
of any individual provisions. Because both the SALDO's regulatory
scheme and general purpose overlapped with those established by
the OGA, the SALDO was found to be preempted both on a purpose
and comprehensive scheme rationale.
2. Provisions Relating to Aspects of Gas Drilling
Explicitly Regulated by the OGA or Imposing Excessive
Costs: Permitting, Capping, and Site Restoration
The SALDO Appendix regulated a number of aspects of gas
drilling that were already explicitly regulated by the OGA. Most
notably, the Appendix established a permitting scheme for gas
drilling. Permit applicants were required to submit copies of their
DEP drilling permit application and development plan; copies of
water flow tests for all wells on property in use for private residences;
quality tests on all wells, springs and surface waters within 1,000
feet of a well site or treatment facility; and an application fee of
$150.46 Even with these submissions, the application requirements
were only minimum requirements and did not guarantee the award
42 Salen, 964 A.3d at 876.
43 Id at 877. Note that the court also mentions natural resources here, implying
that protection of natural resources may be a permissible zoning motive.
44jd
4 Id. at 875.46SALDO Appendix, Art. I §II(B)(1)-(5), Art. III § I (Sept. 2005).
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of a permit." Furthermore, the Township was empowered to revoke
or suspend permits under certain conditions."
Given that the OGA establishes its own well permitting
requirements, the SALDO Appendix's permitting scheme was held
to be explicitly preempted.49 This was not only because the Appendix
was duplicative, but also because it contained greater restrictions
and broader powers to deny permits than the more "permissive"
OGA. For example, the OGA does not require a well operator to
conduct pre-drilling water testing, though an operator may conduct
such testing to defend against a presumption of responsibility for
contamination of nearby water supplies.f Coupled with the fact that
the SALDO gave the Township "unbridled discretion to deny"
permit applications, these types of restrictions enabled the township
to "prohibit what [the OGA] allow[ed]."
Although the court also mentioned in Huntley that "local
legislation cannot ... prohibit what state enactments allow"5" without
being preempted, this cannot be a sufficient basis for preemption. For
example, well sites allowed as conditional uses are still subject to a
conditional use application process with different requirements from
those of the OGA, and that process was at least implicitly approved
of in Huntley. A township should be able to deny an operator who
fails to tender a proper conditional use application the permission
47 Salem, 964 A.2d at 876 (citing SALDO Appendix, Art. I, §2(C)).
48 Specifically, the conditions that could result in revocation where the DEP tak-
ing, or requiring the operator to take, remedial action due to a deficiency in the
water quality or water quantity on the property. SALDO Appendix, Art. I §III(E)
(3)-(4).
4 9 Salem, 964 A.2d at 875 (citing Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 601.201-202) (2011).
I It is presumed that "a well operator is responsible for the pollution of a water
supply that is within 1,000 feet of the oil or gas well, where the pollution occurred
within six months after the completion of drilling or alteration of such well," un-
less rebutted by one of the five defenses in subsection (d). The first two of these
defenses require pre-drilling water testing. Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 601.208(c)-(e) (2011).
'Salem, 964 A.2d at 876.
2 Id. at 875 n.7 (citing to Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964
A.2d, 855, 862 (Pa. 2009)).
*Huntley 964 A.2d at 862.
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to drill, even though the OGA would otherwise allow it. It is clear,
however, that the court found a difference between conditional use
requirements and supplemental requirements related to gas drilling.
The permit process in the SALDO Appendix purposefully targeted
the technical aspect of gas drilling without discernible limits on
Salem's discretion to deny permits, thereby making it susceptible to
all three types of preemption.
Two other areas where the SALDO Appendix specifically
regulated an area of gas drilling addressed in the OGA are wellhead
capping or plugging, and well site restoration." The Appendix
required that wellheads be capped "immediately" after cessation
of drilling, and all aboveground machinery be "immediately"
removed." In contrast, the OGA contains no timeframe for capping.>
The Appendix also required that operators "remove all access
roads . . . and re-grade and restore the surface to its natural pre-
construction condition" within sixty days of cessation of drilling,"
whereas the OGA allows nine months after plugging in which to
remove equipmentf. The court noted that the requirements of the
Appendix, like the ones requiring road restoration to pre-drilling
conditions "appear[ed] to impose excess costs on entities engaged
in oil and gas drilling.
Here, the court offers a possible separate rationale for
finding preemption. Regulations that impose excess costs on
drilling may not purposely target gas drilling or its features, but may
nonetheless impose high costs on the industry, thereby preventing
what the OGA allows. Regulations that create excess costs may not
be related to gas drilling, but they are by definition more onerous
than traditional conditional use application processes. Whether
an excess cost rationale is truly a separate basis for preemption or
whether it merely factors in the analysis of the other three types of
preemption is debatable. Regardless, this rationale was one factor in
54 SALDO Appendix, Art. I § III (D)(1)-(2), Art. II 1(A) (Sept. 2005).
* Id. Art. I §III (D)(1)-(2).
6Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.206(d (2011).
7 SALDO Appendix, Art. I §III(A)(5) (Sept. 2005).
8Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.206(d) (2011).
59Salem, 964 A.2d at 876-77.
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the determination that the SALDO Appendix was a comprehensive
scheme.
3. Provisions Regulating Similar Areas as Those Found
in the OGA: Road and Surface Bonding
The SALDO Appendix also contained provisions regulating
areas similar to those regulated in the OGA. For example, the
Appendix required well operators to post a bond with the township
to cover removal of site access roads and the restoration of the
surface of abandoned access ways.60 Although the OGA contains
no road bonding provision, the Salem court pointed out that the
OGA contained a "parallel" requirement that operators post a bond
conditioned on their compliance with the OGAs water supply
replacement, restoration and plugging requirements.6 ' The OGA
also requires operators to "restore the land surface within the area
disturbed in siting, drilling, completing and producing the well.?6 2
Because the court found that the Appendix's "permitting and
bonding procedures constitute a regulatory apparatus parallel to the
one established by the [OGA],"63 they were held to be preempted in
their entirety.
4. Provisions Regulating Areas Not Explicitly Regulated
by the OGA, but Nonetheless Related to Oil and
Gas Drilling: Ancillary Operations (Access Roads,
Transmission Lines, Water Treatment Facilities)
The SALDO Appendix also imposed requirements on gas
drilling thatare notregulatedby the OGA, butthatthe court nonetheless
held to be preempted. For example, the ordinance imposes width,
slope and other requirements for access roads servicing drilling sites:
depth and casing requirements for transmission lines carrying oil
and gas; and location and bonding requirements for water treatment
facilities used to treat waste products of drilling operations.64 Ehe
60 SALDO Appendix, Art. I §II(A)(6) (Sept. 2005).
6 Salem, 964 A.2d at 875 (citing 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.215).
62Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 601.602, 601.206(a) (2011).
6 Salem, 964 A.2d at 875.
64 SALDO Appendix, at Art. I §III(A)-(C) (Sept. 2005).
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court admitted that these provisions are not specifically addressed
by the OGA, but it describes these provisions as "control[ling]
ancillary features of oil and gas operations," thereby implying
that they were preempted by the explicit feature preemption of
Section 602, which encompasses ancillary matters. Presumably,
these provisions were also indicative of a comprehensive scheme
to regulate gas drilling. Remember, under a comprehensive scheme
rationale, the fact that the provisions regulate aspects of gas drilling
not covered by the OGA makes them more likely to be preempted.
Supplemental requirements related to gas drilling are likely to be
seen as regulations that prohibit what the OGA permits.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - THE PEAWECO CASE AND
GREATER SYMPATHY FOR MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
Since the Huntley and Salem decisions, there has been only
one case that squarely deals with the preemptive effect of Section
602 as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court6 - Penneco
Oil Co. v. The County of Fayette.6 Similar to those cases, Penneco
dealt with a challenge to the validity of the Fayette County Zoning
Ordinance ("FCZO") as it related to gas drilling activity within the
County. What makes the case significant is that the Pennsylvania
6 Salem, 964 A.2d at 877. It is worth noting here that the court mentioned that
these provisions were preempted under the last sentence of Section 602 of the
OGA, which "preempts and supersedes the regulation of oil and gas wells as
herein defined." 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.602 (2011). As such, this last sentence
could present a possible third basis for explicit preemption. As it is vague, howev-
er, and because it is nowhere else mentioned in the opinions, it is more logical to
presume that these provisions were preempted as regulating ancillary "features"
of gas drilling.
66 As will be discussed later, the Arbor Resources case, a Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court decision argued and decided after the Huntley and Salem decisions,
also deals with the preemptive effect of Section 602, but without any reference to
relevant Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the subject. The Blaine case
deals with Section 602 as well, and references the Huntley and Salem decisions,
but, as also will be discussed later, that case dealt with ordinances not promul-
gated under the MPC, implicating a type of express preemption not interpreted by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
67Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fay ette, 4 A.3d 722 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
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Commonwealth Court upheld the ordinance in its entirety despite the
fact that the ordinance allowed for regulation of gas drilling beyond
mere locational determinations. This indicates that the Pennsylvania
lower courts may be willing to read the Huntley and Salem decisions
generously in favor of municipalities when confronted with an
ordinance that falls somewhere between the extremes of the BOZO
and the SALDO Appendix.
In terms of the comprehensiveness of its regulation of gas
drilling, the FCZO is much closer to the BOZO than it is to the
SALDO Appendix, but still allows for more targeted regulation of gas
drilling. The ordinance defines "Oil and Gas 'Well" as a distinct use,
allowing it as-of-right in agricultural/rural and conservation districts
and otherwise as a special exception6 use in all levels of residential
and industrial zones.69 Like the BOZO, the FCZO imposes some
general requirements on all special exception uses: applications
are required, including submission of a "land development plan"
and an application fee, and general performance standards apply.0
All structures permitted as-of-right, including gas wells, also are
required to obtain a "zoning certificate" from the municipal "Zoning
Officer" to ensure consistency with the zoning code." In addition to
the generally applicable requirements, however, there are specific
In this paper the terms "special exception" and "conditional use" are used inter-
changeably. Under the MPC, a special exception is a use that needs approval by
the zoning hearing board, and a conditional use is a use that is approved of by the
municipal governing body according to criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance.
53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 603(c) (2011). As the "special exception" uses in the FCZO
included express conditions, and as the preemption analysis would be the same
either way, the special exception uses may also be described as conditional uses
in this article.
69 FAYETTE COUNTY, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 1000-203 (2006) [hereinafter
FCZO] (Table 1).
Id. §§ 1000-800,1000-500.
711d § 1000-203(A). It is unclear whether a zoning certificate is required for other
special exception uses as well. The text of § 1000-203 does not mention this
requirement for special exceptions, but the definition of "Zoning Certificate"
would imply that it is necessary for all construction: "ZONING CERTIFICATE
- A document signed by the Zoning Officer which is required by this Chapter
prior to the commencement of a usc or the erection, construction, reconstraction,
alteration, conversion or installation of a structure or building." Id § 1000-108(B).
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requirements that relate to gas wells as special exceptions:
A. An oil or gas well shall not be located within the
flight path of a runway facility of an airport.
B. An oil or gas well shall not be located closer than
two-hundred (200) feet from residential dwelling or
fifty (50) feet from any property line or right-of-way.
C. An oil or gas well shall provide fencing and
shrubbery around perimeter of the pump head and
support frame.
D. The Zoning Hearing Board may attach additional
conditions pursuant to this section, in order to
protect the public's health, safety, and welfare.
These conditions may include but are not limited to
increased setbacks.?
The first condition listed above is location based and seems so
unobjectionable that it would be hard to imagine a court invalidating
it on preemption grounds. The other three conditions, however,
lie somewhere in the gray area between the Huntley and Salem
decisions. The most salient motive of the fencing and shrubbery
condition, for example, seems consistent with traditional zoning
purposes, rather than a purpose to regulate gas drilling. However, the
provision nonetheless directly and intentionally impacts operations
at a well site. Condition B also seems on uncertain ground given
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's aside in footnote ten of Huntley
where it opined that provisions increasing the setback requirements
prescribed in the OGA may be preempted.7 The requiiement that
wells be set back two hundred feet from residential dwellings is
arguably in conflict with the OGA, which prohibits wells to be drilled
within two hundred feet of any existing building without consent of
the owner. Condition B also imposes setbacks of fifty feet from any
property line or right of way, a type of setback that does not appear in
72 d. § 1000-851.
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oaknont, 964 A.2d, 855, 864 n.10. (Pa.
2009).
74Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 601.205(a) (2011).
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the OGA. 5 Lastly. Condition D allows for the Zoning Hearing Board
to attach any additional conditions "in order to protect the public's
health, safety, and welfare," including increased setbacks.76 Not only
might this provision conflict with the OGA setback provisions, it
conceivably gives the County plenary power to regulate gas drilling
on an ad hoc basis. Regardless, despite the potential preemption
problems, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld the
ordinance in its entirety as it applied to gas drilling. As such,
this decision begins to fill in the gray area left between location-
based and comprehensive-scheme regulation after the Huntley and
Salem decision in a manner favorable to municipalities. First, the
decision validates the ability of a municipality to apply its as-of-
right and conditional use application requirements to gas drilling
activities as implied in Huntley, even though those requirements are
supplemental to those found in the OGA. The court rejected the idea
that subjecting construction for gas drilling activities to a municipal
approval process is preempted, as long as that process applies to all
development in the municipality." Going one step further, the court
also approved a conditional use section directed specifically at gas
drilling, provided that the section was not directed at a feature of gas
drilling and had a "traditional" zoning purpose."
More specific information may be gleaned by looking at the
conditions that relate to gas drilling. Although Condition C was not
specifically discussed, we can assume the court considered fencing
and shrubbery requirements to fall within the ambit of traditional
zoning purposes without implicating a feature of gas drilling.
Id.
6FCZO § 1000-851(D) (2006).
77 Penneco Oil Co. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 4 A.3d 722, 731 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
("Penneco's characterization of a zoning certificate as a well permit is misleading
as Section 1000-1004 is clearly general in scope and directed at all development
within Fayette County.").
7 1d at 730 ("[Referring to the conditional use provisions directed at gas drilling]
these provisions do not pertain to technical aspects of well-functioning and mat-
ters ancillary thereto (such as registration, bonding, and well site restoration). To
the contrary, the foregoing zoning provisions pertain to an oil and gas well's loca-
tion within Fayette County, preserving the character of residential neighborhoods,
and encouraging beneficial and compatible land uses."').
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Condition B, relating to setbacks, was likewise not discussed, but
the court's tacit approval of this condition is less clear. The lack
of discussion of Conditions B and C could mean the court simply
ignored footnote ten in Huntley and considered setbacks to be
purely location-based regulation, despite the fact that they are also
regulated in the OGA. It also could mean that municipalities are not
free to increase numerical setbacks found in the OGA. but are able
to create setbacks of a different type than those found in the Act.79
The most likely explanation, however, is that the court overlooked
this condition (either intentionally or inadvertently) because of its
de minimus nature. This highlights the fact that a provision's actual
predicted impact on gas drilling might be as, or even more, important
than whether or not it regulates a "feature" of gas drilling.
Condition D, arguably the Ordinance's most controversial
condition, was directly addressed by the court, and it is here that the
court most strongly supports a municipality's ability to regulate gas
drilling:
the fact that the zoning hearing board may attach
additional conditions to a grant of a special exception
in order to protect the public's health, safety, and
welfare or the Zoning Ordinance does not specifically
guarantee issuance of a permit, does not result in
the conclusion that the Zoning Ordinance provides
arbitrary authority to deny permission to drill.s
Although Condition D appears to place few restrictions, if
any, on the County's ability to impose additional conditions on gas
drilling, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court distinguished the
FCZO from the SALDO Appendix, stating that "the discretion to
attach additional conditions in order to protect the public's health,
safety, and welfare . . . is not unfettered. 8 This is compared
to the Appendix, where "a permit 'may' be issued by the zoning
7
"As mentioned above, the OGA refers to setbacks from structures, but does not
mention setbacks from property lines.
soPenneco, 4 A.3d at 730.
8
'Id. at 730-3 1.
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hearing board.?82 This "health, safety, and welfare" restriction was
apparently enough to limit the County from having the "virtually
unbridled discretion to deny permission to drill" that was found to
be problematic in Salei."
V. Two ADDITIONAL CASES - BLALE AND ARBOR RESOURcES
Since the Huntley and Salem decisions there have been two
other cases in Pennsylvania that have dealt with OGA preemption of
a municipal ordinance, and they deserve brief mention here. The first
is a federal district court case, Range Resources v. Blaine Township.84
Blaine dealt with a municipal corporate disclosure ordinance not
promulgated under the MPC. Although the ordinance was of
general applicability to all corporations operating in the township,
the court held that it had used the ordinance to discriminate against
energy companies from mining and drilling in a way that "forbids
what the Oil and Gas Act permits."86 Therefore, it held the ordinance
preempted.
Because the case involved an ordinance not promulgated
under the MPC, the purpose or feature preemptions interpreted
in the Huntley and Salem decisions were not directly applicable.
Rather, the issue in the case was whether the ordinance "purport[ed]
to regulate oil and gas well operations."" As a federal district case
that did not involve a zoning provision, this case may not shed much
light on what a state court might think of a municipality exercising
its authority under the MPC to enact a zoning ordinance of general
applicability. At the same time, the case is instructive, in that the
actual application of an ordinance can be used to determine its true
purpose, despite its facial neutrality. When a municipality uses a
generally applicable ordinance as an opportunity to discriminate
82 1d
1 Range Res., LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009).
84 Range Res., LLC v. Blaine Twp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100932 (W.D.Pa.
2009).
, Id.
6Id at *22-24.
87Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CNs. STr. §601.602 (2011) (preemption for local
ordinances not promulgated under the OGA).
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against gas drilling, that ordinance may face preemption.
The second case is Arbor Resources, LLCv. , Nockamixon
Township, a decision argued and decided shortly after the Huntley
and Salem cases, which did involve an ordinance promulgated under
the MPC that contained specific restrictions on gas drilling." Given
that Arbor Resources had failed to follow the appeals process for
opposing non-operational zoning regulations outlined in the MPC,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decided not to discuss the
preemptions outlined in Huntley or Salem, choosing to dismiss the
case for lack ofjurisdiction.891As the court's discussion of operational
versus location-based regulations occurred in the context of whether
the court could exercise equity jurisdiction in the case, this analysis is
not directly relevant to this article. The case does, however, enforce
the idea that ordinance provisions deemed to be location-based, as
opposed to "operational," may need to be challenged in front of a
zoning hearing board before they may be challenged in court.
VI. Two STEP TEST FOR OGA PREEMPTION OF ZONING
ORDINANCES AND RiSK SPECTRUM FOR PARTICULAR ZONING
PROVISIONS
After review of the ordinances involved in the Huntley and
Salem cases, and in light of the recent decision in Penneco, the gray
area between mere location-based regulations and a comprehensive
gas drilling regulation scheme comes into slightly sharper focus.
Although there is still no definitive guidance regarding ordinances
that fall in the middle of the two regulatory extremes, it is possible
to determine what kinds of ordinance provisions will face a greater
or lesser likelihood of preemption by the OGA - in other words,
a spectrum exists for the risk of preemption. Before looking at
whether a provision is likely to be preempted, however, one first
must consider whether the ordinance as a whole is a comprehensive
scheme to regulate gas drilling. This inquiry can be conceptualized
as a two-step test:
"Arbor Res., LLC v. Nockamixon Txvp., 973 A.2d 1036 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
89Id. at 1047.
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1. Does the ordinance as a whole represent a comprehensive
scheme to regulate gas drilling in direct conflict with the
OGA?
2. If not, to what extent do specific provisions of the ordinance
(1) regulate the "features" of oil and gas operations or (2)
attempt to accomplish the same purposes as those enumerated
in the OGA (i.e., where do they stand on the preemption risk
spectrum described below)?
If the answer at step one is "yes," the entire ordinance is
likely to be preempted by the OGA. As with the SALDO Appendix
in Salem, ordinances containing zoning provisions that might
otherwise be permissible will be preempted if they are bound up in
a broad and blatant attempt to regulate gas drilling. While it is still
unclear exactly what triggers this type of preemption, there are a
few obvious catalyzing factors. The first factor would be a purpose
section declaring the ordinance's intent to regulate gas drilling.
Nothing underscores the fact that an ordinance is a comprehensive
scheme to regulate gas drilling like statutory language confirming this
purpose. Even without an explicit purpose related to gas drilling, a
critical mass of provisions targeting technical or operational aspects
of gas drilling would likewise imply an impermissible scheme.
Chief among these provisions would be any language attempting
to establish a permitting scheme for gas drilling distinct from an
as-of-right or conditional use construction permit scheme already
applicable to all development. On the whole, generally applicable
ordinances will fare better than those singling out gas drilling.
However, as was hinted at in the Salem decision, a scheme that does
not mention gas drilling may still be preempted if it imposes "excess
costs."
When the answer at step one is "no," it is then helpful to look at
the ordinance provision-by-provision to determine if any provisions
might be preempted. As mentioned earlier in the Unanswered
Questions section, although all of the aforementioned case laxx deals
either with a court striking down or upholding an ordinance in its
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entirety,90 it is assumed that, if presented with a largely permissible
ordinance containing only a few preempted provisions, a court
would equitably sever those portions or invalidate them as applied
to gas drilling while "saving" the rest of the ordinance as valid. The
preemption risk spectrum for individual provisions is as follows:
A. Near Certain Preemption
Zoning provisions or conditions that explicitly regulate the
technical features of oil and gas drilling operations, or obviously
overlap with the provisions of the OGA, will almost certainly be
preempted. The Salem court emphasized the inappropriateness
of Salem Township's drilling permit requirements, wellhead
construction and plugging regulations, and site restoration
requirements. All of these requirements regulated technical features
of oil and gas drilling, and were thereby explicitly regulated by the
OGA. Provisions regulating aspects of gas drilling not explicitly
re gulated by the OGA, but nonetheless pertaining to technical feature s
of either drilling or matters ancillary to drilling, also will likely face
preemption. These provisions include those specific to gas drilling,
including those concerning access roads, transmission lines, and
water treatment facilities. These latter regulations, however, may
have a slight chance of surviving a preemption challenge if couched
in a provision that applies to all industries.
Additionally, courts also will likely hold a provision
preempted if it imposes excessive costs on oil and gas drilling,
regardless of whether it is specifically regulated in the OGA.
For example, in Salem, the court found that the "requirement of
restoring nearby streets to their pre-drilling conditions regardless of
whether the wear and tear on such roadways was caused by vehicles
associated with drilling activities" imposed "excess costs."9' As
such, any road-bonding requirement for township or access roads
is particularly likely to be preempted, even if it applies generally
to all industries. As before, general applicability of a road-bonding
requirement would increase its chances of not being preempted.
90 See, supra note 27 for the discussion of meaning of ordinance.
91 Range Res., LLC v. Salem Twp. 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009).
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B. Dark Gray Area - Probable Preemption
The dark gray area includes zoning provisions that one
would expect to be preempted after review of the Huntley and
Salem decisions, but that nonetheless may avoid preemption given
a sympathetic court. As mentioned above, the Fayette County
ordinance contains a setback condition for well sites that a court could
have read to be preempted by the OGA after the Huntley decision,
yet it was upheld by the court in Penneco. This demonstrates that a
zoning provision whose possible preemption is explicitly mentioned
or strongly hinted at in Huntley may escape preemption based on
some combination of (1) de minimus effect; (2) its relationship to
traditional zoning purposes: (3) narrow interpretation of the holding
in Huntley; or(4) court mistake or oversight.
Using setbacks as an example, the court in Huntley noted
that "an ordinance would [not] be enforceable to the extent it sought
to increase specific setback requirements contained in the Act."9'
Although a narrow interpretation of this language would leave
space for other types of setbacks, provided that the specific types
of setbacks mentioned in the OGA are not increased,93 this reading
would adhere to the letter, but not the spirit, of the court's reasoning.
It is therefore unclear why the Penneco court upheld the Fayette
County ordinance that included a fifty-foot property line setback not
mentioned in the OGA. The ordinance's success could be due to the
Penneco court's narrow reading of Huntley's footnote ten, but it is
equally possible that the court simply ignored the provision because
of its de minimus nature, or inadvertently overlooked it altogether.
Another area of regulation that would seem to face probable
preemption is environmental regulation beyond mere minimization
of common nuisances or amelioration of aesthetic impacts. First, it
would be hard to imagine effective environmental regulation that
92 Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d, 855 864 n.10 (Pa.
2009) (emphasis added).
93 The OGA provides two specific setback requirements for wells: (a) 200 ft. from
any existing building or water well without consent of the owner; and (b) 100 ft.
from any stirea, spring, body of water, or wetlands larger than one acre in size.
Pa. Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. CONs. Smnr. 601.205 (2011).
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did not target a feature of gas drilling. However even to the extent
that environnental regulation could be phrased generally - for
example, a general requirement that all industry in the town refrain
from polluting the air or prohibitions on waste dumping - purpose
and comprehensive scheme issues would arise. On the other hand,
Article X of the BOZO, which was tacitly approved of in the Huntley
decision, did contain environmentally based conditions outside
of the scope of traditional nuisance regulation. Furthermore, the
court never mentioned that the permissible purposes of protecting
the character of residential neighborhoods and encouraging the
beneficial and compatible land uses it cited in both the Huntley and
Salem cases were meant to be exclusive. As discussed above, there
is some support that environmental purposes would be permissible.
Indeed, the court in Penneco interpreted permissible purposes
as broadly as possible when it approved of the FCZO's ability to
impose additional conditions on gas drilling based on the "health,
safety, and welfare" of township residents. A similarly sympathetic
court might also approve of a generally applicable environmental
regulation.
C. Light Gray Area - Possible Preemption
Conditional use restrictions whose apparent purpose
is consistent with traditional zoning purposes, and which only
incidentally affect oil and gas activities, bear some risk of
preemption, but are equally likely to be found permissible by a
court. This excludes, however, any conditions related to traditional
zoning purposes that the Huntley court specifically suggested might
be preempted (i.e., setbacks).
As noted above, the fact that the Huntley court upheld
Oakmontfs ordinance, which it found to allow oil and gas drilling as
a conditional use, bolsters the notion that a municipality would be
able to impose at least some conditions on gas drilling. It otherwise
would make little sense to allow codification of gas drilling as a
conditional use. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not
provided any concrete guidance on the subject, the safest conditions
would presumably be those that relate to traditional zoning motives
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identified by the court -i.e. "preserving the character of residential
neighborhoods" and "encouraging 'beneficial and compatible land
uses.'" 94 Provisions also will bear less likelihood of being preempted
to the extent that they do not impose large compliance costs.
Provisions commonly found in most township zoning
ordinances would face the least chance of preemption. These
include provisions directed at controlling odor, noise, dust on public
roads, fencing around hazards, lighting requirements, and aesthetic
regulation. Most of these sorts of traditional zoning regulations are
(most saliently) geared toward the permissible purposes mentioned in
Huntley, particularly the maintenance of the character of residential
neighborhoods. It is important to note, however, that even though an
ordinance provision may be related to a permissible purpose, it still
must not regulate afeature of oil and gas drilling operations. As the
court stated in Huntley:
[O]ur holding ... should not be understood to imply
that any and all regulation of oil and gas development
under the Ordinance would be permissible simply
because it is zoning legislation enacted pursuant to
the MPC. We do not, for instance, suggest that the
municipality could permit drilling in a particular
district but then make that permission subject to
conditions addressed to features of iwell operations
regulated by the Act.
As such, even a provision with a strong traditional zoning
purpose must still avoid targeting technical aspects of oil and gas
development or it will face preemption. One way an ordinance
provision can avoid preemption is by targeting general standards,
as opposed to the gas industry in particular. For example, a noise
provision may be written so that it mandates specific noise muffling
equipment be used during drilling or require a particular procedure
for drilling that creates less noise. Such ordinances would probably
be considered to be regulating a feature of oil and gas drilling
94 Hunly 964 A.2d at 865; Range Rs., 964 A.2d at 76 n.8.
9Huntley, 962 A.2d at 866 n.Il.
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operations. On the other hand, an ordinance may be written to simply
impose a decibel ceiling on all industrial activities in the township.
This sort of regulation is not directed at any technical component of
well operations, and therefore bears less likelihood of preemption.
As the Blaine case reminds us, however, even a facially
gas-drilling-neutral ordinance may face preemption if it is actually
directed at gas drilling as applied. A noise ordinance directed at "all
extractive activities" or "all industry" in a township may be found
to be a back door regulation of gas drilling if gas drilling is the only
extractive or industrial activity within the township borders. General
provisions likewise may face preemption if they necessarily entail
imposing excess costs on the gas drilling industry. A general decibel
level provision that sets a maximum level so low that it mandates use
of a particular sort of muffler or an operational technique that makes
gas drilling cost prohibitive also may be found to be preempted. In a
situation such as this, it is possible that a court may decide to strike
down either the entire ordinance or merely its application to gas
drilling activities.
The gray area, however, also includes some provisions
related to traditional zoning purposes that may unavoidably target
oil and gas drilling. In Penneco, for example, a requiiement that
a fence or shrubbery wall be placed around an active wellhead
was upheld. Well sites may present unique dangers and aesthetic
concerns that other industries within a municipality do not, and the
OGA arguably does not address these sorts of issues. At minimum,
the Penneco case stands for the proposition that courts are willing
to tolerate these types of regulations provided they do not place
onerous restrictions on the gas drilling industry.
D. No Preemption
A municipality's ability to determine the location of oil
and gas development within its borders through the inclusion or
exclusion of oil and gas activities from particular zones was expressly
validated in Huntley. Barring a reversal of Pennsylvania Supreme
Court precedent, zoning provisions allowing or disallowing oil
and gas development within a zone do not face preemption. This
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immunity from preemption also extends to oil and gas drilling as
a conditional use within a zone; the ordinances at issue in both
Huntley and Penneco included such conditional uses.
VII. A QUICK NOTE ON COMPLETE ExcLUsioN OF GAS
DRILLING
One issue not addressed by the two-step test or the preemption
risk spectrum is what would happen if a municipality decided to
completely exclude gas drilling from a township. As the court held
in Huntley, the determination of whether gas drilling may or may
not be included in a particular zone does not constitute regulation
of a feature of gas drilling. Neither does it evince a preempted
purpose, at least with respect to residential zones. Conceivably then,
a municipality could completely exclude gas drilling without facing
the explicit purpose or feature preemptions of Section 602.96
However, there are two problems with a municipality's
ability to completely exclude gas drilling. The first problem
pertains to comprehensive scheme preemption. Although the
location-based restrictions discussed in Huntley did not trigger the
purpose or feature preemptions of Section 602, the court had no
occasion to discuss what would happen if the municipality used
those restrictions to completely exclude gas drilling. It is at least
possible that, in aggregate, location-based restrictions may present
a comprehensive scheme to regulate gas drilling that impermissibly
conflicts with the legislative scheme of the OGA. At issue again is
what triggers comprehensive scheme preemption, and whether it is
possible to trigger that type of preemption without any infringement
on the explicit preemptions found in Section 602.
The second problem is the added burden that any
municipality faces when it attempts to completely exclude a
particular use. In Beaver Gasoline v. Zoning Hearing Board of the
Borough of Osborn, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "a
zoning ordinance which totally excludes a particular business from
an entire municipality must bear a more substantial relationship
96 Or, if a municipality really wanted to play it safe, it could rezone the entire city
residential, and then exclude gas drilling.
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to public, health, safety, morals and general welfare than an
ordinance which merely confined that business to a certain area of
the municipality." Although a substantial relationship may exist
wx hen the use is one that is "generally known to give off noxious
odors, disturb the tranquility of a large area by making loud noises,
[or has] the obvious potential of poisoning the air or water,"" the
municipality may have the burden of showing this relationship. In
the General Battery v. Zoning Hearing Board of Alsace Township
case, for example, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that
a municipality did not meet its burden for completely excluding
industrial waste disposal facilities from the town, especially given
that the industry was regulated by the Commonwealth." The oil
and gas industry is similarly regulated at the state level and, while
a municipality may still be able to meet its burden of showing a
"substantial relationship," this poses an additional challenge.
CONCLUSION
It is important to recognize that while the Huntley and
Salem decisions are the most powerful precedent on municipal
zoning authority to affect gas drilling activities, they are not the
final word. The two ordinances addressed in those cases, the BOZO
and the SALDO Appendix, respectively, represent two extremes
on a regulatory continuum: at one end, merely determining the
permissible locations for gas drilling within the township and, at the
other, a comprehensive and purposeful scheme to regulate all gas
drilling related activity. While a municipalitys ability to regulate
gas drilling is clearly limited, there are still a number of traditional
types of zoning regulations that remain in the gray are between these
two extremes. The only case to directly address a zoning ordinance
falling within this gray area, thus far, is the Penneco case, which
upheld the validity of the ordinance in its entirety and its application
97 Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Osborne, 285 A.2d 501, 503 (Pa.
1971).
98 Id. at 504.
99 Gen. Battery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Alsace Twp., 371 A.2d 1030 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977).
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to gas drilling, even with respect to provisions that arguably
could have been held preempted after Huntley. The Penneco case
demonstrates the discretion that a court may exercise in determining
the fate of municipal ordinances.
In the end, given this broad discretion, intangible factors
may weigh more heavily than the nuances of statutory language
in the preemption analysis for a challenged ordinance. Although
understanding the contours of a "feature" of gas drilling and the
permissible overlap between traditional zoning purposes and the
enumerated purposes of the OGA are important, the "feel" of an
ordinance may be more determinative. The explicit preemption
carve-out for zoning laws in Section 602 demonstrates a legislative
desire to balance the interests of energy exploration and production
with the fundamental authority of a local government to control
the living space of its residents. The more gas drilling threatens
reasonable regulations designed to protect the serenity of living
spaces, the more likely it will be found to have no preemptive effect.
Likewise, where an ordinance appears to be primarily concerned
with the process of drilling or environmental regulation beyond the
ambit of traditional zoning regulation, it probably will be struck
down as preempted. In a preemption analysis, the sympathies and
biases of a particular justice will also undoubtedly play a role.
The question of the extent of municipal authority to regulate
gas drilling under the OGA does not operate within a vacuum. With
recent calls from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection to overhaul the OGA,100 and with national press attention
focused on the environmental and health concerns surrounding gas
drilling,'0 ' a court might favor municipal arguments, at least until
a legislative change to the OGA materializes. In the meantime, we
should expect to see more challenges to ordinances, more ordinances
that push the envelope, and clarification by courts of the ability of
municipalities to affect gas drilling through zoning regulation.
100 Robert Swift, DEP: Overhaul Gas Act, SCRANTON TIMES TRIBUNE (June 3,
2011), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/gas-drilling/dep-recommends-gas-act-
overhaul-to-protect-water-sources-from-drilling1.11563154.
10 See eg., Drilling Down Series, THE NEX YumK Ts11 (through Dec. 31, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/newxs/us/series/drilling down/index.htmnl.
